On Dec 14, 100 years of matching theory in Hungary. Here is the conference program.
And on Dec 15:
|Efficient and Incentive Compatible Liver Exchange|
|First Choice-Maximizing School Choice Mechanisms, by (University of Zurich)|
|School Choice with Voucher, by (Sabanci University)|
|Iterative Versus Standard Deferred Acceptance: Experimental Evidence, by (WZB Berlin)|
|Testing different cardinal matching mechanisms in the field, by (Higher School of Economics, St. Petersburg)|
|Hungarian secondary school and higher education admissions data in the Databank, by (Hungarian Academy of Sciences)|
|Estelle Cantillon (Université Libre de Bruxelles) and Utku Unver (Boston College)|
|Team Formation as an Incentive Device, by (University of Southampton)|
|Assignment maximisation, by (WZB Berlin)|
|Refugee resettlement, by (University of Oxford)|
In November, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences also hosted a
Workshop on Future Directions in Computational Social Choice, which contained papers on stable matching by Ágnes Cseh: Popular Matchings and Zsuzsanna Jankó: Various Stable Matching Concepts.